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Penal Code Section 654: The
Prosecutor's Dilemma
By GmAnLD M. ScmHmNi*
CALIFORNIA Penal Code section 654 provides that "an act or
omission which is made punishable in different ways by different pro-
visions of this Code' may be punished under either of such provisions,
but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal
or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the
same act or omission under the other ... ." Penal Code section 654
manifestly has a dual purpose: (1) to prevent the imposition of mul-
tiple punishments for a single criminal act2 and (2) to bar prosecu-
tions based on a single act after a court has either formerly acquitted
or convicted and sentenced the defendant for that particular act or
indivisible course of criminal conduct.
The objectives of Penal Code section 654 are clear, but their attain-
ment has posed difficult problems for California courts. Specifically, it
is the section 654 decisions of our appellate courts commencing with
Neal v. State' and continuing to the present that have left in their
wake serious problems. It is the function of this article to define these
problems, especially as they arise in municipal courts, and suggest
methods of resolving them. The multiple punishment and multiple
prosecution clauses will be treated under separate headings in this
article.
Multiple Punishment Clause
In Neal,4 the leading case on section 654's bar against multiple
punishment,5 the defendant threw gasoline into a married couple's
* B.S. in Criminology, 1955, Fresno State College; LL.B., 1964, Hastings College
of the Law. Deputy District Attorney, San Mateo County, California (Keith C. Soren-
son, District Attorney). The author is indebted to Mr. Gregory S. Jensen, member of
the third year class at Stanford Law School, for his research assistance.
I (Emphasis added.) It has been held that the words "this code" do not confine
the statute to the Penal Code. People v. Brown, 49 Cal. 2d 577, 320 P.2d 5 (1958).
2 The leading case of Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 19, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 611, 357
P.2d 839, 843 (1960), reiterated the rule of People v. Brown, supra note 1, at 590,
594, 320 P.2d at 14, that the protection of § 654 extends to cases "where a course of
conduct violated more than one statute .....
3 55 Cal. 2d 11, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839 (1960).
4Ibid.
G Neal is the leading case because it established the current interpretation of the
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bedroom, then ignited it. As a result, severe injuries were sustained by
the husband and wife. The defendant was tried and convicted on two
counts of attempted murder6 and one count of arson.7 The trial court
imposed consecutive sentences on each of the attempted murder
counts. The defendant then sought a writ of mandamus 8 to compel
the Adult Authority to set aside the convictions on both the second
count of attempted murder and the count of arson. As one of the
grounds for the issuance of the writ, the defendant maintained that
the trial courthad punished him three times for a single act, and had
therefore violated the prohibition against multiple punishment con-
tained in section 654. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction for
arson on the ground that the trial court violated section 654's multiple
punishment prohibition because the defendant's primary objective
was to murder the husband and wife and arson "was merely incidental
to the primary objective of killing."9 The court thus held that because
the defendant had only a single objective he could be punished only
once, even though he violated two distinct criminal statutes, one of
which was not a necessarily included offense of the other. The two
consecutive attempted murder convictions and sentences were al-
lowed to stand. 10
To appreciate the significance of the Neal decision it is essential
to note that the court cited an earlier case 1 for the rule that, "section
words "same act or omission" contained in § 654. Id. at 19, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611, 357
P.2d at 843. According to Shepard's Citations, CAL. PEN. CODE § 654 was cited by
California appellate courts 17 times between 1872 and 1942, and 46 times between
1942 and 1960. From 1960, the year of the NeaZ decision, to 1965, the section has been
cited 78 times.
6 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 187, 664.
7 CAL. PEN. CODE § 447a.
8 The Supreme Court treated the petition for mandamus as one for habeas corpus.
This was done pursuant to the rule that where a defendant states a set of facts justify-
ing the issuance of habeas corpus, his mistaken application for an inappropriate writ
will not prevent the court from issuing habeas corpus.
9 55.Cal. 2d 11, 20, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 612, 357 P.2d 839,,844 (1960).
1' This was done on the theory that section 654's prohibition against multiple
punishment is to "insure that the defendant's punishment will be commensurate with
his criminal liability. A defendant who commits an act of violence with the intent to
harm more than one person or by a means likely to cause harm to several persons is
more culpable than a defendant who harms only one person." Ibid. This statement
reflects a legitimate criminal law goal. However, as Professor Perkins aptly points out,
where a defendant's "act or omission" serves as the basis for punishment, society's
interests are often inadequately protected, because the determinative factor for im-
position of punishment should be the social harm caused by the defendant's "act or
omission." Thus, the goal of section 654, as set forth by the Supreme Court, is unlikely
to be attained, because the focus for punishment consideration is the "act or omission"
itself. See Ptnm.Ns, Cnm rAL Aw 6 (1957).
11 People v. Brown, 49 Cal. 2d 577, 320 P.2d 5 (1958).
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654 has been applied not only where there was but one 'act in the
ordinary sense ... but also where a course of conduct violated more
than one statute and the problem was whether it comprised a divisible
transaction which could be punished under more than one statute
within the meaning of section 654."12 The court in Neal endeavored
to distinguish a divisible course of conduct from a single act by for-
mulating the "intent and objective" test.13 In establishing this new
guideline for determining whether the defendant's criminal conduct
constituted a single act or course of criminal conduct, or several acts,
the Supreme Court stated:
Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives
rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends
on the intent and objective of the actor. If all the offenses were inci-
dent to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one
of such offenses but not for more than one.14
The court did not cite any authority as a basis for the "intent and
objective" test, and therefore it authored new law for California.
The significance of the "intent and objective" test is of major im-
portance to California prosecutors; a prosecuting attorney's failure to
understand the ramifications of this test can result in a substantial in-
justice to the state. Conversely, the failure of defense lawyers to
appreciate the significance of the test may result in a disservice to
criminal defendants.
Criticism of the Neal Intent and Objective Test
Justice Schauer, dissenting in Neal,15 attacked the "intent and ob-
jective" test on the basis that the majority, by formulating and apply-
ing it, "[struck] down a factual determination which rested upon evi-
dence that supports the contrary inferences on which the trial court
1255 Cal. 2d at 19, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611, 357 P.2d at 843. (Emphasis added.)
13 For a list of the various tests which California courts have used for determining
whether the defendant's conduct was a single act or several acts see McKissack, Recent
Developments in the Criminal Law: The Included Offense Doctrine in California, 10
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 870, 885 (1963). For other divisibility tests see Note, The Protection
From Multiple Trials, 11 STAN. L. REv. 735, 742 (1959); Horack, The Multiple Conse-
quences of a Single Criminal Act, 21 MINN. L. REv. 805, 812-14 (1937). One test is
predicated on the number of injuries to the state, but this has been used primarily in
double jeopardy cases; see 20 HAnv. L. REv. 642, 643 (1907) and 51 H~nv. L. REv.
925, 926 (1938). The "intent and objective" test remains as the divisibility yardstick
to be used by California courts today. See People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748, 760,
26 Cal. Rptr.. 473, 479, 376 P.2d 449, 455 (1962).
14 55 Cal. 2d at 19, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611, 357 P.2d at 843. This language in Neal
illustrates that the scope of § 654 extends beyond necessarily included offenses.
15 Id. at 21, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 613, 357 P.2d at 845.
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based its final judgments."" -He said the majority had erroneously per-
mitted habeas corpus to be used for the purpose of reviewing or ini-
tially deciding "questions of the intent and objective of the criminal
actor,"17 and that the "intent and objective" test is not a satisfactory
one to be applied by a court. In the later case of People v. McFar-
land,18 Justice Schauer further criticized the "intent and objective"
test on the ground that the formulation of that test was unnecessary
in Neal because the majority could have reached the same result by
finding that defendant committed only a single act, viz., throwing gas-
oline into his victims' bedroom. Since section 654 specifically refers to
"an act" and bars multiple punishment based on a single act, "there
was therefore no need to go on to discuss what rule might be invoked
in an entirely different class of cases, i.e., those involving not a single
act-the only situation embraced by the language of the code section
-but a 'course of criminal conduct' encompassing multiple acts ... :,,9
Justice Schauer further contended that the majority, in formulating
the intent and objective test, had confused the word "act" contained
in section 654, with the "intent and objective of the actor," a phrase
not contained in section 654 and which the majority coined in the
Neal case. He pointed out another defect inherent in the majority's
"intent and objective" test when he wrote that it distracts "from the
factual analysis necessary to achieve the purpose of section 654, and
instead becomes enmeshed in a post hoc speculation as to the scope
of the criminal's objective."20 He continued the attack on the test set
forth by the majority, and aptly pointed out that the criminal himself
often has an ill-defined objective in the initial planning of his crime(s)
and rarely considers "such matters as sudden interruptions by third
parties and alternative means of perpetration, escape, or conceal-
ment."21 Justice Schauer contended that the Neal -dictum (meaning
16 Id. at 22, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 613, 357 P.2d at 845. This objection is premised on the
rule that the function of appellate courts is to review errors of law rather than pass
on questions of fact. See 3 Wrrm, CALIForIA. PRocEnuRE, Appeal § 69 (1954).
17 55 Cal. 2d at 24, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 614, 357 P.2d at 846. Here the dissenting
opinion pointed out that the court quoted an earlier case, In re Chapman, 43 Cal. 2d
385, 273 P.2d 817 (1954), where the court held: "Whether the evidence accepted by
the trier of fact shows petitioner guilty of one crime or of two [or of a course of crim-
inal conduct, which, although it constitutes two separately defined crimes, can be
punished but once by reason of section 654] is in part a factual question." Id. at 390,
273 P.2d at 820. The Chapman court relied on this rule as an alternate ground for
denying habeas corpus.
1858 Cal. 2d 748, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449 (1962).
19 Id. at 765, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 489, 376 P.2d at 465.
20 Id. at 768, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 491, 376 P.2d at 467.
21 Ibi.
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the "intent and objective" test) resulted in appellate courts resorting
to conjecture and speculation as to what the defendant's intent and
objective was at the time of the crime(s) and that in making their
decisions they often had ignored the trial record.22
The preceding objections to the Neal court's establishment of the
"intent and objective" test are but some of Justice Schauer's criti-
cisms2 s There are, however, additional objections to the Neal test not
discussed by Justice Schauer which seriously impede the administra-
tion of criminal justice and interfere with the prosecution's duty to
protect the public from criminal conduct. Some of these objections
can be illustrated by considering the current strategic use of section
654 by defense lawyers in criminal cases.
The Straiegic Use of Section 654 by Defense Lawyers
The California Supreme Court has indicated that the protection of
section 654 extends to the Vehicle Code,2 4 and the District Court of
Appeal has specifically ruled that section 654 is applicable to that
code.25 This application to the Vehicle Code becomes quite significant
in consideration of the fact that in 1963-64 there were 3,034,797 non-
parking traffic violations filed in California municipal courts.26 In view
of the foregoing, consider the following hypothetical situation:
A police officer files a report with the district attorney's office indi-
cating that he had initially observed D while D was driving an auto-
221bid. In the same dissenting opinion, Justice Schauer stated that the majority
had apparently formulated the "intent and objective" test from the suggestion of a New
York inferior court, People v. Savarese, 1 Misc. 2d 305, 114 N.Y.S.2d 816, 835-36
(Kings County Ct. 1952), and that New York's highest court had never adopted the
lower court test Justice Schauer also detailed how the United States Supreme Court,
in Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915), had expressly rejected the "intent and
objective" test. It should be noted that New York has a statute identical to § 654
(N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1938).
23Not all of Justice Schauer's criticisms of the Neal "intent and objective" test
were listed in the text. For example, in Neal he formulated a hypothetical situation
illustrating the undesirable results which would follow if courts applied that test, and
in McFarland he engaged in a comparison between cases, decided subsequent to Neal,
having comparable fact situations, but which were decided differently even though
each court used the "intent and objective" test to determine the issue of divisibility
of criminal conduct.
24See People v. Brown, 49 Cal. 2d 577, 591 n.4 320 P.2d 5, 14 n,4 (1958),
where the Supreme Court stated that section 654 not only prohibits multiple punish-
ment arising from Penal Code offenses, but applies to punishments provided by other
codes also.
25People v. Young, 224 Cal. App. 2d 420, 36 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1964). In this case
the court decided the section 654 issue by resorting to the strict language of the
section and completely refrained from using the "intent and objective" test.
2620 CAL. JuDnCiAL CouNciL Brmni. B'EP. 120 (1965).
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mobile 70 miles per hour in a 35-mile per -hour zone. The officer's re-
port indicates that he pursued D in a patrol car with his siren on
and flashing his red light in an attempt to stop D. D ignored the red
light and siren and drove faster. During the course of this pursuit D
drove to- the left of a double line, went through a stop sign, and then
struck and killed a pedestrian in a cross-walk. The district attorney's
office issues a complaint charging D with excessive speeding,28 refus-
ing to obey an officer's lawful order,29 failure to drive on the right-
hand side of the road,30 going through a valid stop sign,31 and reckless
driving.21 The complaint further charges D with misdemeanor vehicle
manslaughter.3 "
When D is arraigned in municipal court on the preceding charges,
his attorney pleads D guilty to excessive speeding and not guilty on
all other counts. D's lawyer then asks that D receive sentence imme-
diately.3 4 The court, exercising its discretion, complies by imposing a
fine on D for the speeding violation, and sets a trial date on the other
counts to which D pleaded not guilty. When D subsequently appears
in court for trial on those counts, his lawyer claims the protection of
section 654, contending that the "intent and objective" test established
by Neal prevents the court from imposing punishment on D, even
though he may be found guilty on the remaining counts. Thus, D's"
lawyer contends, a trial on those counts would be a nullity. 5 D's law-
yer argues that during D's entire course of conduct he had only a sin-
gle intent and objective-to drive an automobile.86 Since the court
2 7 While D's situation is hypothetical, district attorneys -throughout the state regu-
larly see actual cases comparable to it.2 8 CAL. VEmI CODE § 22350.
29 CA r. VExmCLE CODE § 2800.
80 CAL. VEnucLE CODE § 21650.
31 CAL. VEmcrE CoDE § 22450.
32 CAL. VEMCLE CODE § 23103.
3 CAL. PEN. CoDE § 192(3)(b).
34 A municipal or justice court judge must wait six hours but not more than five
days to sentence D on the count to which he pleaded guilty. CAr.. PEN. CoDE § 1449.
But a defendant in D's situation waives the six-hour delay in order to be punished
immediately. Thus, the judge cannot wait for the prosecution of the other counts to
sentence D unless he refers D to the probation department. Ibid. See note 61, infra,
for further details on the procedure relative to probation referrals by courts.
85 The author has seen actual court cases where defense lawyers have used § 654
in the manner described in D's hypothetical situation. Other deputy district attorneys
have reported comparable incidents to the author.36In response to this defense contention, the prosecution could argue that the
intention to drive an automobile is not a criminal intention or objective. Virtually all
the Supreme Court and district court of appeal cases in applying the Neal "intent and
objective" test have looked at only the defendant's criminal intentions and objectives.
Thus, to use a defendant's non-criminal intent seems inappropriate.
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previously punished D for his "course of criminal conduct," which was
motivated by his single "intent and objective," section 654 prohibits
further judicial punishment.37 If the court agreed with this interpreta-
tion of the Neal "intent and objective" test D would not face punish-
ment or prosecution on the remaining counts.
Can it be said that the foregoing result is one that the legislature
intended when it enacted Penal Code section 654, or that such a result
properly safeguards the public from dangerous criminal behavior?
Would this result achieve the end that the Neal majority intended,
viz., that "the protection against multiple punishment is to insure that
the defendant's punishment will be commensurate with his criminal
liability"?38
Manifestly, the legislature never intended that section 654 be used
in the manner just described. What then was the intention of the
legislature when it enacted the section? The answer might be revealed
by considering those crimes for which D could actually be charged in
a multiple-count complaint for the conduct ascribed to him in the
hypothetical situation. For driving at an excessive rate of speed, D
could have been charged with violating four different sections of the
Vehicle Code.9 For ignoring the officer's red light and siren, D could
have been cited for violating two sections of the Vehicle Code40 and
one section of the Penal Code.41 D could be cited with violating three
Vehicle Code sections42 for the act of driving to the left of the double
line and two Vehicle Code sections43 for the stop sign violation. For
striking the pedestrian, D could be charged with violating two Vehicle
Code sections44 as well as one Penal Code section.45 In addition to the
87 It should be noted that, while lawyers often make this argument, and the trial
courts sometimes accept it, they are not justified in so doing. Even if punishment would
be barred, the issue could not properly be raised until after trial. See text accompany-
ing notes and infra.
8855 Cal. 2d 11, 20, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 612, 357 P.2d 839, 844 (1960).
89 CAL. VEHIcLE CODE §§ 22349 (excess speed), 22350 (basic speed law), 22352
(exceeding prima facie speed limit), and 23103 (reckless driving).
4o CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 2800 (refusing to obey an officer's lawful order) and
21806 (failure to yield the right-of-way to an emergency vehicle).
41 CAL. PEN. CODE § 148 (resisting, delaying or obstructing an officer in the per-
formance of his duty).
42 CAL. VEHcIL CODE §§ 21650 (failure to drive on the right-hand side of the
road), 21460 (driving to the left of double parallel solid lines, and 21658(a) (moving
out of a lane of traffic without first ascertaining that such movement could be made
safely).
4 3 CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 22450 (failure to stop at a valid stop sign) and 22350
(this section requires a driver to operate his vehicle at a reasonable and prudent speed;
D's speed, when he went through the stop sign, should have been zero).
44 CAXL. VEHIcLE CODE §§ 23104 (reckless driving proximately causing bodily in-
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preceding possible charges against D, he could be cited for violating
county and municipal ordinances which are comparable in their lan-
guage and effect to those Vehicle and Penal Code sections just listed.
A reasonable judicial test, which would reflect the legislative intent
behind section 654, should prevent D from being punished for violat-
ing all the preceding listed statutes and should also prevent D's escap-
ing the more serious consequences arising from the manslaughter
charge. This result could be achieved by permitting punishment for a
violation of any statute which is not a necessarily included offense of
another.4" The application of the necessarily included offense doctrine
to D's situation would preclude D's being punished for violating the
multitude of statutes listed in the preceding paragraph, but at the
same time it would still subject him to possible conviction on the
manslaughter charge, despite the speeding fine. If D is to be punished
commensurately with his criminal liability, which is the purpose of
the prohibition against multiple punishment according to the Neal
majority,4 7 it is a non sequitur to hold that the imposition of a fine
for the speeding violation will prevent D from being judicially pun-
ished for the unlawful killing of a pedestrian.48
An additional defect in the "intent and objective" test is that it
jury) and 21950 (violating a pedestrian's right of way while he was within a marked
cross-walk).
45 CAL. PzN. CoDE § 192(3) (b) (misdemeanor vehicle manslaughter).46 This, of course, is contrary to the holding in Neal and several other cases pre-
ceding it. The Neal case stated: "The proscription of section 654 against multiple pun-
ishment of a single act, however, is not limited to necessarily included offenses." 55
Cal. 2d at 18, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611, 357 P.2d at 843. The lesser included offense doc-
trine was defined in People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d 589, 596, 184 P.2d 512, 516 (1947),
where the court said: "[W]here an offense cannot be committed without necessarily
committing another offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense."
47 55 Cal. 2d at 20, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 612, 357 P.2d at 844.
48 Vehicle Code offenses are mala prohibita, and it is settled law in California that
the doing of an act malum prohibitum may be a criminal offense regardless of the actor's
intent. Thus, Justice Traynor, author of the majority's Neal opinion, stated in People
v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 801, n.2, 299 P.2d 850, 853 n.2 (1956), that certain classes
of statutes "enacted for the protection of the public health and safety, e.g., traffic and
food and drug regulations" do not have the actor's wrongful intent as a necessary ele-
ment of the offense. Since intent is not an element of Vehicle Code offenses, would it
be rational to apply an "intent and objective" test to them in order to ascertain a de-
fendant's criminal liability? Further, in all the § 654 cases to date, the California courts
have been considering the wrongful intent(s) of the defendant for purposes of deter-
mining divisibility of conduct. But in Vehicle Code cases, the mere intent to drive is
not unlawful, and thus it would seem inappropriate to determine a defendant's lawful
intentions for the purpose of resolving the divisibility of criminal conduct issue. This
last observation would not, however, hold true in cases where the defendant started
to drive knowing his license was suspended or revoked. In this limited instance his
intent to drive would be unlawful.
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does not provide a guideline which enables courts to determine the
scope of a defendant's intent and objective. Thus, an appellate court
reviewing a case where the record is silent on the subject of multiple
punishment must resort to conjecture. For example, consider a case
where D shoplifts a ten-dollar skateboard in a merchant's store and
escapes without detection.49 Three hours later D shoplifts another ten-
dollar skateboard in the same store and is arrested on the premises
for that offense. An appellate court could conclude that at the time
D stole the first skateboard he had but a single objective, and that
was to steal from his victim just that one time; if it reached this con-
clusion then D would properly be subject to separate punishments
for each theft because his intent and objective did not extend to the
subsequent theft. Conversely, the court could conclude that D had
but a single objective at the time he stole the first skateboard, and
that was to steal both items; this conclusion by the court would result
in D being punished only once even though D stole two different items
at different hours because D had but a single intent and objective."'
The appellate court's choice in the preceding situation is a significant
one because D would be subject to two consecutive terms in the
county jail if he intended to steal only once at the time of the first
theft, whereas he would be subject to only one jail term if his intent
and objective encompassed the theft of both items. This result clearly
demonstrates the lack of merit in the "intent and objective" test in
that as a defendant's criminal intent and objective initially expands,
his criminal liability diminishes.51 The absence of a guideline enabling
appellate courts to apply the "intent and objective" test can only result
in uneven application of the test by California courts; thus both prose-
cuting and defense attorneys are handicapped in attempting to assess
a defendant's ultimate criminal liability. The "intent and objective"
test thus defeats two of the primary purposes of the criminal law,-
to forewarn members of the community as to what constitutes punish-
able criminal behavior, and to insure that the law imposing punish-
ment for criminal conduct is uniformly applied.52
The "intent and objective" test, which currently applies only to
49 This would constitute a violation of CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 484, 488 (petty theft).
5 0 In People v. Bynes, 223 Cal. App. 2d 268, 273, 35 Cal. Rptr. 633, 637 (1963),
the District Court of Appeal applied the "intent and objective" test in a unique man-
ner. The court concluded the evidence indicated that each defendant had two objec-
tives from the outset, and this permitted dual punishment to be imposed.
51 See Seiterle v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 397, 403, 20 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5, 369 P.2d
697, 701 (1962).
5 2 C CLA & MAWIHTAI., Camrms 1 (6th ed. 1958).
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Penal Code 654's multiple punishment clause, and not to its multiple
prosecution clause,5 3 affects all stages of criminal proceedings. There-
fore, it is essential to consider the legal effect of that test at the pre-
trial and trial levels.
Pre-Trial and Trial Proceedings
At the complaint drafting stage, the prosecution is forced to specu-
late on the subject of the defendant's intent and objective. The prose-
cution, at this time, is thereby put in a situation similar to that of
the appellate courts in section 654 cases where the trial record is
silent on that subject. The failure of the prosecution to indulge in
"intent and objective" speculation at the complaint drafting phase
may well lead to unsatisfactory results from the prosecutor's point of
view. For example, consider the following hypothetical case. A police
report indicates that D was initially observed by witnesses screaming
profanities while pounding on a house door at night. A woman was
seen to open the door, and D grabbed her, pulled her outside and
began to strike her. D finally knocked the woman down, removed a
knife from his clothing and made slashing movements at her with the
knife without striking her person. The police then arrived -at the scene
and ordered D to drop his knife; D refused and the police informed
him he was under arrest. D refused to submit and the officers were
compelled to use force to subdue him.
If the prosecution drafts a single complaint charging D with dis-
turbing the peace,54 assault,55 battery,56 exhibiting a deadly weapon
in a threatening manner, r and resisting arrest,58 it provides defense
counsel an opportunity to plead his client guilty to the disturbing the
peace charge, get him inmediately sentenced upon that charge by
waiving time for the imposition of sentence, and plead him not guilty
on the remaining counts. This strategic maneuver places the prose-
cution in the position of having to resist defense counsels contention
5 3
"Section 654's preclusion of multiple prosecution is separate and distinct from
its preclusion of multiple punishment." Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 21, 9 Cal. Rptr.
607, 612, 357 P.2d 839, 845 (1960). However, the District Court of Appeal appears
to be divided on the question of applying the "intent and objective" test, as a means
of determining divisibility of conduct, to both clauses. Compare People v. Wilson, 224
Cal. App. 2d 738, 37 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1964) with People v. Manago, 230 Cal. App. 2d
645, 41 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1964).
54 CAL. PEN. CoDE § 415.
55 CAL. PEN. CoDE § 240.
56 CAL. PEN. CODE § 242.
57 CAL. PEN. CoD)E § 417.
5 8 CAL. PEm. CODE § 148.
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that section 654 prohibits the court from imposing further punishment
upon D even though D is ultimately convicted on all the counts to
which he pleaded not guilty. The court would then be required to
determine whether the disturbing the peace charge, to which D
pleaded guilty, was within the "intent and objective" of those counts
to which D had pleaded not guilty. If the court agreed with the de-
fense attorney, the prior imposition of punishment for disturbing the
peace would prevent the court from imposing additional punishment
on D in the event he proceeded to trial and was found guilty on the
remaining counts. In view of the foregoing, one solution to the prob-
lem confronting the prosecutor is to file a complaint charging D with
the most serious offense (resisting arrest) and omit other possible
statutory charges. However, this "single-count solution" does not serve
the best interests of the courts or the public; it also increases the
possibility that the prosecuting attorney will obtain no conviction at
all.
In cases where the scope of the defendant's intent and objective
is uncertain, if the prosecution adopts the "single-count" solution, it
may preclude a court from determining that the defendant's course
of conduct was divisible and thereby punishable more than once.
Thus, if the prosecutor reacts to the defense counsel's strategic use of
section 654 by charging a defendant with a single count, this "solution"
works against the stated objective of section 654 pronounced by the
Neal majority: to insure that a defendant's punishment will be com-
mensurate with his criminal liability. 9 Therefore, the prosecution
should not readily adopt the "one-count solution" even though the
Neal formulation of the "intent and objective" test tends to encourage
such a result. In view of the foregoing, the question that remains is:
should the prosecution charge a defendant with several counts in a
single complaint, thereby risking the prospect that the defense will
use section 654 in the strategic manner previously described?
In drafting criminal complaints the prosecution must distinguish
between "single-act" cases where several statutes are violated in the
same instant of time, such as the Neal case where the defendant vio-
lated both arson and attempted murder statutes by the act of throwing
gasoline into the victims' bedroom, and cases where statutory viola-
tions seemingly arise from the same act but are not confined to the
same instant of time.60 In the first group of cases the prosecution should
59 55 Cal. 2d at 20, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611, 357 P.2d at 844.
6o An example of this latter type of case occurs when a defendant is charged with
going through an arterial stop sign (CAL. VEmcME CODE § 22450) and with driving
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charge a defendant only with the most serious crime; such a procedure
would be in accordance with the purpose of section 654. But in the
latter group of cases, the prosecutioii should file a single complaint
charging the defendant with violating each statute which is not a
lesser included offense of another. In those cases where the prosecu-
tion is unable to predict how a court would apply the Neal "intent and
objective" test it should file a multiple-count complaint in order that
a court will have the opportunity to pass on the question of divisibility
of conduct. In the last group, the prosecution can counteract the
defense's strategic use of section 654 by requesting the court to refer
the defendant to the probation department for a sentencing report
when he enters his plea of guilty to the least serious crime contained
in the complaint. Then the prosecution can bring the defendant to
trial on the more serious charges contained in the multiple-count com-
plaint before he is actually sentenced on the matter referred to the
probation department.6' This procedure evades the defense's strategic
use of section 654 because the defendant has not been punished on
the charge to which he pleaded guilty in the initial phase of the
judicial proceeding.62
Both the prosecution and the defense are confronted with problems
in those cases where the defendant enters a plea of guilty to the least
serious count in a multiple-count complaint, pleads not guilty to the
remaining counts, and is punished upon the count to which he pleaded
guilty. The defense attorney's problem in this connection arises at the
time for trial on the remaining counts to which the defendant pleaded
not guilty. At this stage of the proceeding, counsel for the defendant
will endeavor to invoke the protection of section 654 against multiple
punishment on the theory that his client has already been punished
for the "same course of criminal conduct" in a prior judicial proceed-
ing. But Penal Code section 1016, which enumerates the pleas a de-
while under the influence of intoxicants (CAL. VEmcIe_ Conr § 23102). In this situa-
tion, the defendant commits but a single act, driving, but the violation of driving while
under the influence of intoxicants precedes, coincides with, and also follows the point
'of time at which the stop sign violation occurred.
61 Under CAL. PEN. CODE. § 1449, the court may extend the time for sentencing
not more than twenty-one days in any case where the question of probation is consid-
ered. The court can order a probation report on its own motion under this section even
if the defendant objects or states that he will refuse to accept probation; see People v.
Billingsley, 59 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 846, 139 P.2d 362 (App. Dep't Super. Ct., Los
Angeles, 1943).
62 People v. Tideman, 57 Cal. 2d 574, 21 Cal. Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007 (1962),
is a case where the prosecution successfully used this strategy. See text accompanying
notes 64-67 infra.
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fendant can enter in a criminal proceeding, does not specifically pro-
vide for a plea of prior punishment-though it does permit a plea of
once in jeopardy. The question raised then is whether the defendant's
plea of guilty to the first count placed him in jeopardy so as to bar a
trial on the counts to which he pleaded not guilty.68 The question was
answered in People v. Tideman. In that case the defendant was
charged in a single complaint with abortion 65 and murder.6 At the
time for trial the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the abortion
count and a plea of once in jeopardy, along with his plea of not guilty,
to the murder count. The trial judge referred the defendant to the
probation department on the abortion count and then proceeded with
the jury trial on the murder count. The jury found the defendant
guilty of murder; the court then dismissed the abortion count and
sentenced the defendant on the murder count. On appeal the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that
in a single criminal action (pleading any number of counts), no plea
of guilty to, or order of dismissal or acquittal of any separately
pleaded offenses, included or otherwise, will bar the progress of that
prosecution as to the other counts. The prosecution on such other
counts may continue until each, on its own merits, has been severally
and finally disposed of by bringing the defendant to conviction and
sentence or to acquittal.67
A defendant, then, is precluded from raising the plea of former jeop-
ardy at the trial on those counts to which he pleaded not guilty. Thus,
Penal Code section 1016 does not provide a defendant with a plea
which will enable him to bar the actual trial on those counts to which
he pleaded not guilty; he must raise Penal Code 654's prohibition
against multiple punishment subsequent to trial, such as at sentencing
or on appeal.68
63 A defendant may bar a second trial on a meritorious plea of former jeopardy by
obtaining a writ of prohibition; this procedure was established in Gomez v. Superior
Court, 50 Cal. 2d 640, 652, 328 P.2d 976, 984 (1958) and was followed in Cardenas
v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d ,273, 275, 14 Cal. Rptr. 657, 659, 363 P.2d 889, 891
(1961).
64 57 Cal. 2d 574, 21 Cal. Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007 (1962). In this case the court
said that federal and state statutes dealing with double jeopardy and § 654 "are neither
identical shields nor (properly applied) do they overlap. They have different origins.
Each rests on a different base, has a different objective, and performs a different func-
tion. If confusion is to be avoided it is important that the two not be intermingled."
Id. at 578, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 209, 370 P.2d at 1009.
(5 CAL. PEN. CODE § 274.
60 CA. PEN. CODE § 187.
67 57 Cal. 2d at 583, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 212, 370 P.2d at 1012.
08 The defendant should not be able to invoke the multiple prosecution clause of
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The prosecution's problem also occurs when the defendant suc-
ceeds in being punished on his guilty plea to the least serious count
in a multiple-count complaint. The problem is whether or not the
offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty is connected by his
"intent and objective" to the counts in the same complaint to which
he pleaded not guilty. If the prosecution concludes that there is a
section 654 connection, it might appear that to continue with prose-
cution of the case would be pointless because the application of the
"intent and objective" test would preclude a court from imposing fur-
ther punishment upon the defendant if he were convicted. However,
such a conclusion would be erroneous. The prosecution has substantial
reasons for obtaining convictions, even though a court could not im-
pose punishment upon those convictions by virtue of section 654.
For example, a record of conviction for writing fraudulent checks 9
affords the basis upon which the prosecution may charge a defendant
with a prior conviction in a felony complaint; the existence of the prior
conviction converts the second offense from a misdemeanor to a
felony. If the prosecution did not proceed with the defendant's trial
because it appeared that a court could not impose punishment, no
"prior" could be charged against the defendant and the legislature's
intent in this area would be defeated. A further important reason for
the prosecution to obtain convictions, even when punishment is not
possible, is to aid various administrative agencies. For instance, the
Department of Motor Vehicles is charged with the responsibility of
suspending or revoking drivers' licenses upon receipt of abstracts of
conviction ' in certain cases. If the prosecution does not proceed
against the defendant on those charges to which he pleaded not guilty,
the Department would not be able fully to perform its statutory
duties. In McFarland,2 the Supreme Court made a pronouncement
which is compatible with the viewpoint that the prosecution should
§ 654 as a means of barring the trial upon those counts to whch he pleaded not guilty,
for the reason contained in People v. Tideman, supra note 62, viz., because there is no
second prosecution. The trial upon those counts to which defendant pleaded not guilty
ensues as a result of the defendant's pleadings and not because the prosecution filed
more than one complaint.
6 9 CAL. PEN. CODE § 476a(6).
70 Ibsd. There are many other cranes in addition to writing fraudulent checks
which impose heavier penalties for their commission in the event a defendant has a
prior conviction for the same offense. For example, driving a vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicants (CAL. VEHIcLE CODE § 23102) and possessing marijuana (CAL.
Hx rAL & SAFErY CODE § 11530).
71 See CAL. VxmcLz CODE §§ 12810, 13365.
7258. Cal. 2d 748, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449 (1962).
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seek convictions even though section 654 would preclude punishment
upon those convictions.7 There the court stated:
[1]t should be stressed that section 654 proscribes double punish-
ment, not double conviction; conduct giving rise to more than one
offense within the meaning of the statute may result in initial con-
viction of both crimes, only one of wbich, the more serious offense,
may be punished.... The appropriate procedure, therefore, is to
eliminate the effect of the judgment as to the lesser offense insofar
as the penalty alone is concerned.74
A further consideration for the prosecutor is that a study of Neal
and the section 654 cases following it indicates that the time for avoid-
ing the problems stemming from appellate court application of section
654 is at the trial itself. Neal makes it clear that the question of
whether or not a defendant's course of conduct is divisible for punish-
ment purposes should be raised at trial. In a case prior to Neal the
Supreme Court said. "It is, of course an established rule that habeas
corpus may not be used instead of an appeal to review determinations
of fact made upon conflicting evidence after a fair trial."75 But the
Neal court said it was not reviewing determinations of fact made upon
conflicting evidence, because the subject was not raised during trial
and the Attorney General on the return to the order to show cause
did not contest the defendant's statement of facts.76 In view of the
7 3 However, there is a District Court of Appeal case, In re Keller, 232 A.C.A. 637,
42 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1965), which held that only a burglary count could be pleaded as
a "prior" for the purpose of using it against the defendant in an habitual criminal
proceeding. The theft could not be pleaded as a "prior" because it was indivisibly con-
nected to the burglary. This holding works against the Supreme Court's ruling m
People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748, 762, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 481, 376 P.2d 449, 457
(1962), which specifically stated that section 654 bars multiple punishment and not
multiple conviction. But for a contrary District Court of Appeal holding, see People v.
Wallace, 217 Cal. App. 2d 440, 31 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
7458 Cal. 2d 748, 762, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 481, 376 P.2d 449, 457 (1962). The
court seems to have overruled itself on this point because in the earlier Neal case it
stated: "If only a single act is charged as the basis of the multiple convictions, only
one conviction can be affirmed, notwithstanding that the offenses are not necessarily
included offenses." 55 Cal. 2d at 19, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611, 357 P.2d at 844 (1960).
However, this language from Neal refers to "a single act" whereas the McFarland lan-
guage referred to "conduct giving rise to more than one offense." It is possible that the
Supreme Court intentionally made a distinction, thereby creating two classes of section
654 cases with regard to the question of whether more than one conviction will be
allowed to stand. If such was the court's intention then only one conviction can be
anrmed in the "single act" cases.
75 1n re Chapman, 43 Cal. 2d 385, 390, 270 P.2d 817, 820 (1954).
76The Supreme Court in Neal, 55 Cal. 2d at 17, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 610, 357 P.2d
at 842 (1960), apparently conceded the validity of the Attorney General's contention
that the question of divisibility of the defendant's course of criminal conduct is a
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foregoing, the prosecution should be prepared to raise either during
the trial or at sentencing the divisibility of criminal conduct issue in
.all multiple-count single complaint cases.77 Such a procedure has twin
advantages. It would preclude the defendant from raising the ques-
tion by habeas corpus and it would relieve appellate courts of the
burden of having to speculate about a defendant's "intent and objec-
tive"-a burden forced upon them by previous trials where there was
a complete failure to raise the question of the defendant's intent and
objective for criminal liability purposes.8
Multiple Prosecution Clause
While the multiple punishment clause is designed to prohibit dual
punishment for "the same act," the multiple prosecution clause has
the purpose of preventing harrassment of criminal defendants, which
would occur if they were subjected to trials based upon an "act" for
which they had previously been acquitted, or convicted and sen-
tenced.79 The issue of multiple prosecution arises in cases where the
prosecution files several complaints; it does not arise in cases where
the prosecution files a single complaint charging multiple counts.8 0
Section 654's multiple prosecution clause provides that *;here a
defendant has been acquitted, or convicted and sentenced, under one
code provision, a subsequent prosecution based upon the same act
or omission is barred. This rule applies even though a different code
factual one, because it answered the contention by denying that it was reviewing de-
terminations of fact made upon conflicting evidence.
77Pople v. Mistretta, 221 Cal. App. 2d 42, 34 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1963) provides a
clue as to how the question of divisibility of the defendant's course of criminal conduct
can be raised during trial. In analyzing that case, the appellate court determined that
the fact situation indicated that the defendant's intent and objective changed during
the course of his criminal conduct. The court found that this change was manifested
by the defendant switching from one criminal act to an entirely different criminal act
during the period that the defendant was terrorizing his victim. The court concluded
that the defendant's alteration of his original intent and objective exposed the defend-
ant to punishment for each crime charged in the complaint.
78 Since Neal, the district courts of appeal have considered approximately seventy
cases involving § 654. However, if the rule regarding the scope of what an appellate
court can review on appeal were adhered to, and if the question of multiple punish-
ment is resolved at the trial level upon sufficient evidence, it should be precluded from
consideration at the appellate level. This is based on the premise that the question of
multiple punishment is one of fact; the function of an appellate court is to review
questions of law only.
79 Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 21, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 612-13, 357 P.2d 839, 844
(1960).
8o People v. Tideman, 57 Cal. 2d 574, 583, 21 CaL. Rptr. 207, 212, 370 P.2d 1007,
1012 (1962).
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section is used as the basis for the second prosecution. Significantly,
both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution clauses of sec-
tion 654 refer to the "same act or omission." Thus, the test formulated
to determine what constitutes an act or acts for one clause should
also be used for the other clause.8' In Neal, the Supreme Court stated
that "section 654's preclusion of multiple prosecution is separate and
distinct from its preclusion of multiple punishment."82 The court did
not indicate whether the "intent and objective" test was to be applied
to the prosecution clause in the same way it had been applied to the
multiple punishment clause. In the subsequent case of Seiterle v.
Superior Court,83 the Supreme Court seemed to indicate that the
"intent and objective" test would be used in connection with the mul-
tiple prosecution clause. In Seiterle, the defendant entered pleas of
guilty to two counts of first degree murder, one count of kidnaping
for the purposes of robbery with bodily harm, and one count of con-
spiracy to commit murder. After a jury trial was conducted for the
purpose of fixing the penalty, defendant received the death penalty
for the murder counts, and life imprisonment for the kidnaping of-
fenses and the conspiracy to commit murder. On appeal, the sentence
on the murder counts was reversed because of prejudicial error, but
the life imprisonment sentence imposed for the kidnaping was modi-
fied only to the extent that the words "without possibility of parole"
were added. The defendant then applied to the Supreme Court for
a writ of prohibition, contending that the pending penalty "retrial"
on the two murder counts should be barred because it would violate
the multiple prosecution clause of section 654. Defendant also raised
the issue of double jeopardy. In answering defendant's contentions,
the Supfeme Court stated that "it is only if, as petitioner claims, 84
the record compels the conclusion that the murders of Mr. and Mrs.
Duvel were the culmination of an 'indivisible' transaction involving
their kidnaping with bodily harm and terminating with their ultimate
murders that the provisions of section 654 would properly be appli-
cable."85 Then the court quoted section 654's multiple punishment
clause, omitting mention of the clause barring multiple prosecution.
The subject of multiple prosecution was not otherwise discussed in
81 See Note, The Protection From Multiple Trials, 11 ST. L. R v. 735, 747, n.50
(1959).
8255 Cal. 2d 11, 19, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 611, 357 P.2d 839, 843 (1960).
8857 Cal. 2d 397, 20 Cal. Rptr. 1, 369 P.2d 697 (1962).
84 The court is apparently referring to the petitioner's claim that the penalty retrial
would violate section 654's multiple prosecution clause.
8557 Cal. 2d 397, 400, 20 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2, 369 P.2d 697, 698 (1962).
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the decision and the court apparently considered the issue before it
to be multiple punishment. If the Supreme Court intended to rule
that the Neal "intent and objective" test was applicable to the mul-
tiple prosecution clause, it did not adequately do so. The discussion,
as it relates to Neal, is dictum, rather than law, because the "retrial"
was for the purpose of determining penalty (punishment) only; the
defendant was attempting to bar multiple punishment, not multiple
prosecution. Justice Schauer, who concurred and dissented, succinctly
pointed out that the penalty retrial was not a sutsequent prosecution
because the defendant was subjected to a single. prosecution upon
several counts.80 Thus, section 654's multiple prosecution clause was
not applicable to the case, and the court rendered its decision on the
basis of the multiple punishment clause.17
The Supreme Court's vague method of dealing with the question
of whether the "intent and objective" test should be applied to section
654's multiple prosecution clause is undoubtedly responsible for the
"split" decisions on that subject rendered by the district courts of
appeal. The significance of applying either the test set forth in Neal,
or some other test, to the multiple prosecution clause can readily be
appreciated when consideration is given to some of the representative
split decisions.
District Court of Appeal Multiple Prosecution Cases
People v. Wilson"' involved a situation where the defendant was
informed of his arrest by an officer while both were seated in the
latter's car. The defendant fled to 'his father's house a short distance
away. The officer pursued the defendant, and demanded that he sur-
render, .but the defendant refused to do so. The officer returned to his
car, obtained handcuffs, and returned to the house. The defendant
then threatened him with a rifle, and escaped. A complaint was filed
against the defendant, charging him with exhibiting a firearm in a
'rude, angry and threatening manner.8 9 The trial of the cause resulted
in a hung jury. A complaint was next filed charging the defendant
with resisting arrest °0 The first case was not brought to trial within
86 Id. at 404-405, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 5, 369 P.2d at 701.
87 Mr. Witkin states that "the multiple prosecution preclusion of P.C. 654 is gov-
erned by the same 'ultimate object" test of 'act or omission as the multiple punish-
ment prohibition," and he cites Seiterle as authority. 2 Wrr=, CALIWoRNIA CnM
Punshment for Crime § 950 (1963). Thus, Withn and this author are in disagreement
as to the effect of Seiterle on the multiple prosecution clause.
88224 Cal. App. 2d 738, 37 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1964).
89 CAL. PEN. CODE § 417.
9 0 CAL. PEN, CODE § 148.
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thirty days after the mistrial, and defendant, not having waived his
right to a speedy trial, obtained a dismissalf 1 After the information
charging him with resisting arrest was filed in superior court, the
defendant successfully moved for an order setting it aside, pursuant
to Penal Code section 995,92 and dismissing the action. From that
order, the People appealed. The appellate court felt that the two Penal
Code sections charged against the defendant in separate misdemeanor
complaints were not the "same offense" within the meaning of Penal
Code section 138711 and therefore the defendant could not prevail by
relying on that statute. The court also rejected defendant's contention
that Penal Code section 1023," which prohibits "double jeopardy,
would stay prosecution of the defendant on the second misdemeanor
complaint, which was filed after the mistrial. The court, commenting
on defendant's double jeopardy theory, held that the second prose-
cution was based upon a crime which was neither the same as the
first crime nor a necessarily included offense of the initial crime
charged against the defendant.
The court then considered the multiple prosecution clause of sec-
tion 654, and held that since there had been neither conviction nor
sentence in either action, the only question was whether or not the
dismissal of the first action amounted to an "acquittal" within the
meaning of section 654. The defendant contended that the second
prosecution was based upon the same act which served as the founda-
tion for the first prosecution and therefore the dismissal of the first
action was an "acquittal" under section 654 which would bar the sec-
ond prosecution. This contention was rejected as a non sequitur by
the court, which held that "the act upon which the first prosecution
was based is but one incident in the entire conduct of defendant upon
which the second prosecution is based."95 The court concluded by
holding that the second prosecution was not based upon the same act
91 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1382.
9 2 Since CAL. PEN. CODE § 995 provides for dismissal of an information only on
the grounds that the defendant had not been legally committed by a magistrate before
it was filed, or that he had been committed without legal or probable cause, the order
setting aside the information must have been based on the proposition that defendant's
commitment was illegal, since prosecution. would be barred.
93 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1387 provides: "An order for the dismissal of the action, made
as provided in this chapter [§§ 1381-1387], is a bar to any other prosecution for the
same offense if it is a misdemeanor, but not if it is a felony." (Emphasis added.)
94 
"When the defendant is convicted or acquitted or has been once placed in jeop-
ardy upon an accusatory pleading, the conviction, acquittal, or jeopardy is a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged in such accusatory pleading." CAL. PEN.
CODE § 1023.
95 24 Cal. App. 2d at 744, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
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within the meaning of section 654, reversed-the order which had dis-
missed the action in superior court, and remanded the case for further
proceedings 8 Thus, the First District Court of Appeal, Division Two,
did not employ the Neal "intent and objective" test as a means of
determining the issue of multiple prosecution.
Nine months later, People v. Manago97 was decided by Division
Three of the same court. In Manago, the defendant entered a locker
room in a department store and was observed rummaging through
clothing contained in two lockers. He was arrested in the store, and
a search of his person revealed that he was carrying a concealed
straight-edge razor. Defendant was charged with burglary in a felony
complaint; he was charged in a separate misdemeanor complaint with
violating a city ordinance which proscribed the carrying of a con-
cealed weapon while "hiding, lurking, or loitering upon or about the
premises of another." The first trial was based on the felony, resulted
in a hung jury, and was reset for trial. Five days later, defendant was
tried on the misdemeanor charge and was convicted. He was sen-
tenced to six months in the county jail. A new trial was had on the
burglary charge, and defendant was found guilty of burglary in the
first degree, the first degree finding being based on his possession of
the razor at the time of the burglary.
The court stated: "It seems clear, however, that the rule against
multiple prosecution is at least as broad as that against double pun-
ishment," 8 citing Neal. After reiterating the Neal "intent and objec-
tive" test, the court said it would be guided by those cases which
dealt with double punishment in deciding the case at hand.99 The
98 Significantly, the court analogized the term "the same offense," contained in
CALE. Pnx. CODE § 1387, to the term "the same act" in section 654. The effect of this
is a holding that the words "the same act" in the multiple prosecution clause are to be
applied in accordance with the "necessarily included offense" doctrine for the purpose
of determining if there has been a prohibited multiple prosecution in violation of
section 654.
97230 Cal. App. 2d 645, 41 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1964).
98Id. at 647, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
99 In Neal the Supreme Court said that a defendant could be punished separately
for the harm done to each victim even though there was but a single act. 55 Cal. 2d
at 20, 9 Cal Rptr. at 612, 357 P.2d at 844. Since the Manago court said it would follow
the double punishment cases for guidance in deciding multiple prosecution cases would
the preceding Neal pronouncement apply to multiple prosecution cases? If it did apply
the existence of multiple victims would enable the prosecution to file separate com-
plaints, one for each victim, even though the defendant committed but a single act.
The Supreme Court probably will not, however, permit the prosecution to file separate
complaints in the multiple victim situations. In the concluding part of the Neal opinion
the court said, "the rule against multiple prosecutions is a procedural safeguard against
harassment and is not necessarily related to the punishment to be imposed; double
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court rejected the Attorney General's contention that defendant en-
tered the locker room carrying the concealed razor with the intent
to commit theft, and then formed a new intent to "bide, lurk, or loiter"
there while carrying the weapon. 100 Emphasis was apparently placed
on the fact that the issue of an alteration by the defeiidant of his
original intent and objective was not raised during either trial. The
court concluded that the prosecution had relied upon identical con-
duct to establish both the felony and the misdemeanor since there was
insufcient evidence introduced at trial on the subject of whether or
not the defendant's original intent and objective changed during his
course of conduct. The court said that the evidence placing the de-
fendant in the locker room for "three or four minutes" weakened the
attorney general's contention regarding the defendant's change of
intent, apparently feeling that it was unlikely defendant's intent and
objective had changed in that time. Concluding its opinion, the court
specifically states that there was no bar of double jeopardy operating
in favor of the defendant, because the misdemeanor was not an of-
fense necessarily included in the felony charge. Thus, the court ap-
plied the Neal "intent and objective" test to bar the subsequent prose-
cution on the burglary charge.1 1
Applicability of the Neal Test to the Multiple
Prosecution Clause
Despite the split in the district courts of appeal on the question
of the applicability of the Neal "intent and objective" test to the
multiple prosecution clause, it seems doubtful that the Supreme Court
will apply that test to the one clause and not the other. However,
there is a basis upon which the Supreme Court can make a divided
application of the test. In Neal, the Supreme Court stated that "section
654's preclusion of multiple prosecution is separate and distinbt from
its preclusion of multiple punishment. The rule against multiple prose-
prosecution may be precluded even when double punishment is permissible." 55 Cal. 2d
11, 21, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 612-13, 357 P.2d 839, 844-45 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
100 Apparently the People were relying on the same theory that was advanced in
People v. Mistretta, 221 Cal. App. 2d 42, 34 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1963), where the District
Court of Appeal held that a defendant could be exposed to multiple punishment within
the meaning of section 654 if the evidence indicated that the defendant's original intent
and objective changed during his course of criminal conduct.
1O Kellert v. Superior Court, 235 A.C.A. 673, 45 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1965) is another
district court of appeal case dealing with § 654s multiple prosecution clause. The court
did not apply the Neal "intent and objective" test; it resorted to the language of sec-
tion 654 and held that the second prosecution was based upon the "same act" for
which the defendant had previously been prosecuted and punished.
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cutions is a procedural safeguard against harassment and is not neces-
sarily related to the punishment to be imposed. ... . Because the
two clauses contained in section 654 are separate and distinct, each
having a different purpose, the Supreme Court could conceivably ap-
ply a different divisibility of conduct test to each clause. While the
ultimate purpose of each clause is different, the principal factor being
considered by the courts in both clauses is the interpretation to be
given to the words "an act or omission"; this is the common denomi-
nator of the two clauses. But the presence of both common and un-
common factors in the two clauses provides the Supreme Court with
the opportunity to apply the Neal "intent and objective" test to either
the multiple punishment clause alone or to both clauses. If the Su-
preme Court ultimately applies the Neal "intent and objective" test
to cases similar to Manago and Wilson, where the prosecution filed
more than one complaint against a defendant, the result will be that
the multiple prosecution clause will not achieve the goal set for it by
that court, viz., to prevent harassment of a criminal defendant, for
the reasons outlined below in the discussion of procedural problems.
Procedural Aspects of the Multiple Prosecution Clause
It is clear that there is a strong, direct relationship between Penal
Code section 654's multiple prosecution clause and the double jeop-
ardy doctrine set forth in Penal Code section 102 a.*°e Both statutes
are primarily intended to prevent the harassment of a criminal defend-
ant by means of subsequent trials.'04 However, despite their similarity,
the procedure for invoking protection is different in each case. The
procedural method for invoking the multiple prosecution clause ren-
ders that clause, for practical purposes, ineffectual in many cases.
Penal Code section 1016, enumerating the various pleas a defend-
ant can enter in a criminal action, provides for a plea of once in
10255 Cal. 2d 19, 21, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 612, 376 P.2d 449, 845 (1960). See Note,
The Protection From Multiple Trials, 11 STmr. L. REV. 735, 740 (1959).
103 See note 94, supra.
104 However, one substantial distinction between the former jeopardy doctrine and
§ 654's multiple prosecution preclusion is that § 654 requires that there must have been
"an acquittal or conviction and sentence" before its protection is available. The former
jeopardy doctrine's protection becomes available when a defendant is "(1) placed on
trial, (2) for the same offense, (3) on a valid indictment or information or other accus-
atory pleading, (4) before a competent court, (5) with a competent jury, duly im-
paneled and sworn and charged with the case; or, if the trial is by the court, it must
be 'entered upon'." 1 WrrIN, CAxwoRi& CnndEs Defenses § 184 (1963). Thus, a
defendant may avail himself of the former jeopardy protection without ever having
reached the stage of acquittal or conviction and sentence.
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jeopardy. A defendant can avail himself of this once in jeopardy pro-
tection by establishing that he previously faced trial for the same
offense, 05 or for an offense which is either a lesser or greater included
offense. 06 But in those cases where the offenses charged against the
defendant are not included offenses, and he is subjected to separate
prosecutions, the defendant cannot invoke section 1016's once in jeop-
ardy plea. 07 The question then is, can a defendant invoke the multiple
prosecution clause protection in advance of the second trial in those
cases where he cannot enter the once in jeopardy plea? Such cases
involved situations where the defendants were not permitted to raise
the protection of Penal Code sections 1023 and 1016 because the
offenses in the separate complaints were neither lesser nor greater
included offenses under California law.10 8 Thus, a defendant in the
Manago-Wilson situation is not able to raise the former jeopardy doc-
trine as a bar, and cannot raise the shield provided by section 654's
multiple prosecution clause because Penal Code section 1016 does not
provide for such a plea. 09 Since there is no statutory plea available
105 Ibid.
100 1 WrraN, CAroaNu Cmum Defenses §§ 201, 205, 208, 209 (1963).
107Id. 9§ 205, 207.
10 8 See note 46 supra for the California judicial interpretation of what constitutes
necessarily included offenses. In California the greater offense is included in the lesser;
see 1 WrrmN, CAanoRmA Cmum Defenses § 209 (1963).
109 Can a defendant raise some other plea in the trial court in advance of the
second trial for the purpose of barring it under § 654's prohibition? If the charge in
the prior trial and the pending trial are connected within the meaning of section 654's
multiple prosecution clause, the trial court involved in the pending trial would be with-
out jurisdiction. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1004 provides that a demurrer for lack of jurisdic-
tion can be entered only where that defect appears on the face of the accusatory
pleading. Since the trial court would necessarily have to consider the defendant's entire
fact situation and its relation to the prior trial in which the defendant was either ac-
quitted or convicted and sentenced, it is obvious that the jurisdictional defect would
not appear on the face of the complaint. Thus, a defendant cannot raise the issue of
the court's lack of jurisdiction in § 654 multiple prosecution cases having fact situations
comparable to those of Wilson and Manago. CAL. PEsN. CODE § 1385 provides that the
court, either on its own motion or by application of the district attorney, can order the
dismissal of a case in the furtherance of justice. The reason for the dismissal must be
set forth and no dismissal can be made for any cause which would be a ground of
demurrer to the accusatory pleading. CAL. PENs. CODE § 1387 says, "An order for the
dismissal of the action . . . is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense if
it is a misdemeanor, but not if it is a felony." In cases where the prosecution has
filed more than one complaint the question arises as to whether or not a defense at-
torney would be able to persuade the court to dismiss the second action on its own
motion under CAL. PEN. CODE § 1385. If the court did dismiss on its own motion in
misdemeanor cases the defendant would not gain an advantage because the prosecu-
tion has the right of appeal from such dismissal by virtue of CAL. PEN. CODE § 1466(a).
In felony cases where a court dismissed on its own motion under section 1385 the de-
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to a defendant in this situation, the only method whereby he may bar
the subsequent municipal court trial is to apply to superior court for
a writ of prohibition.110 Section 654's multiple prosecution clause is
thereby rendered substantially ineffective as a protective procedural
device, because of the nature of the proceedings involved in a peti-
tion for a writ of prohibition.
A writ of prohibition may be issued when: (1) there is a threat-
ened judicial act which, if executed, would be without or in excess of
the acting court's jurisdiction; (2) the threatened act has not been
completed; and (3) there is no other adequate remedy."' The crim-
inal defendant who finds himself in a situation comparable to that in
Wilson and Manago will meet all three of the preceding criteria." 2
The state, as the real party in interest, has an opportunity to oppose
the issuance of a writ of prohibition."8 This initial opposition is not
an adversary pleading or a return; "it is merely a legal argument
designed to prevent issuance of an alternative writ or order to show
fendant would be faced with the prospect of having the district attorney reffle the
identical charge under authority of § 1387. Thus, § 1385 does not provide a remedy
for defendants in the multiple prosecution area.
110 Seiterle v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 397, 399, 20 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2, 369 P.2d 697,
698 (1962). The general rule adhered to by the Supreme Court and the district courts
of appeal is that a defendant may not by-pass the superior court in applying for a
writ of prohibition. The" rule exists because the appellate courts do not have machinery
designed to hear cases where facts are in dispute. In the few cases where the appellate
courts have permitted a defendant to by-pass the superior court, the grounds have been
an emergency involving the public welfare. See 3 WrrnmN, CALFOnNiA PRocEDurm
Extraordinary Writs § 8 (1954) Kellet v. Superior Court, 235 A.C.A. 673, 45 Cal. Rptr.
355 (1965), appears to be a section 654 case where the District Court of Appeal
ignored the preceding general rule. In this case the defendant was charged in a mis-
demeanor complaint with violating CAL. PEN. CoDE- § 417 (exhibiting a firearm in a
threatening manner); he pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to jail. Before
the plea was entered, the prosecution filed a felony complaint against the defendant
for violation of CAL. PEN. CODE § 12021 (possession by a convicted felon of a firearm
capable of concealment). The defendant was held to answer at the preliminary hearing
and he applied for a writ of prohibition to bar the superior court trial. The District
Court of Appeal was in a position to review all the facts because it had the preliminary
hearing transcript, which showed that the facts of the case were not in disputb at that
hearing. The court specifically commented upon the fact that the prosecution had not
raised at the preliminary hearing the issue of whether the defendant had committed
one act or two acts. The court, in issuing the writ, did not deviate from the rule that
a defendant cannot by-pass the superior court in his application for a writ when the fact
situation is unsettled, because there was no dispute over the facts in the preliminary
transcript
" Boone, Prohibition: Use of the Writ of Restraint in California, 15 HAsNS
L.. 161 (1963).
112 This point is demonstrated by Seiterle v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 397, 20
Cal. Rptr. 1, 369 P.2d 697 (1962).
1183 WrnNn, CALon oPA PocEmmU Extraordinary Writs § 57 (1954).
cause where the petition is clearly without merit.1 14 If the petition
survives this stage, "the matter should then be considered on its merits
with the opposing party permitted to answer."'1 5 When the superior
court deliberates on the merits of the case at the hearing on the order
to show cause, it can consider questions of law and fact which may
be raised in an answer filed by the People, and it can also receive
evidence." 6 Thus, the defendant who petitions for a writ of prohi-
bition for the purpose of barring a subsequent trial is subjected to a
judicial proceeding which is somewhat comparable to a trial."7 The
superior court will receive evidence on the entire fact situation sur-
rounding the criminal conduct and consider the fact situation in rela-
tion to the former matter in which the defendant was either acquitted
or convicted and sentenced. The issue of guilt or innocence is, of
course, not determined. The multiple prosecution clause of section 654
is thus rendered partially ineffective because the only procedural
device which the defendant can invoke results in almost the very thing
which the defendant seeks to avoid-a judicial proceeding where
questions of law and fact are passed upon concerning the case
itself."8 Despite the fact that section 654's multiple prosecution clause
does not prevent the harassment of a defendant, it can afford pro-
tection from ultimate conviction. Thus, in the Manago case, the con-
viction itself was eliminated when the defendant invoked the multiple
prosecution clause subsequent to trial. However, the purpose of the
clause is to prevent multiple prosecution, rather than eliminate a
conviction subsequent to prosecution.
The Defendant's Waiver of the Multiple
Prosecution Protection
The strong similarity between the prohibition of double jeopardy
and that of multiple prosecution raises the question of whether the
"4 Id. § 58.
115Id. § 59. (Emphasis added.)
116 'If an answer be made, which raises a question as to a matter of fact . ..
affecting the substantial rights of the parties, and upon the supposed truth of the alle-
gation of which the application for the writ is based, the court may, in its discretion,
order the question to be tried before a jury and postpone the argument until such
trial can be had, and the verdict certified to the court" CAL. CODE Cy. PROc. § 1090.
(Emphasis added.)
17 If the superior court grants the writ, this would be comparable to an acquittal,
but if it is not granted the defendant must face the trial which he attempted to bar.
118 The plea of once in jeopardy provided by CAL. PEN. CODE § 1016 is also sub-
ject to the same procedural defect as the multiple prosecution clause is in cases where
the defendant seeks a writ of prohibition to bar a trial. However, under the once in
jeopardy plea the defendant has alternatives to seeking a writ of prohibition and there-
fore the jeopardy plea is mot completely ineffective.
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waiver rule in the former jeopardy cases will be applied to the mul-
tiple prosecution clause. It is established law in California that the
failure of the defendant to raise the special plea of once in jeopardy
results in a waiver of that defense." 9 ,It has already been noted that
Penal Code section 1016 provides for a specific plea of once in jeop-
ardy but makes no provisions for pleading the multiple prosecution
clause of section 654. However, this omission should not prevent the
application of the waiver rule to the multiple prosecution clause.
Defendant should not be afforded more opportunity to raise the de-
fense of multiple prosecution than that of double jeopardy. A firm
rule should be established providing that the failure of a defendant
to apply for writ of prohibition when he seeks to invoke the protection
of the multiple prosecution clause will operate as a waiver of that
protection.
Conclusion
Multiple Punishment
What is needed in the multiple punishment area is a Penal Code
section that will preclude the imposition of punishment for offenses
which are necessarily included offenses of one for which the defendant
has already beeli punished. The Neal "intent and objective" test
should be overruled, to prevent defendants from using their initial
intent and objective status as a complete shield to punishment for
all the statutory violations committed in their course of criminal
conduct. The application of the lesser included offense doctrine to
the issue of multiple punishment would restore predictability to an
area of criminal law where predictability is essential; it should be
applied in all cases except those where the multiple statutory viola-
tions coincided exactly i point of time.120 An absence of predicta-
bility in the punishment area of criminal law has the effect of placing
the defense lawyer, the prosecuting attorney, and the community in
a position of complete ignorance as to the ultimate liability of a
criminal defendant.' 12
Multiple Prosecution
There is no need for the legislature to enact a substitute for the
multiple prosecution clause because the necessarily included offense
doctrine is already codified in Penal Code section 1023; that doctrine
provides the proper protection for both defendants and the public.
119 WrrmN, CALrFo NrA CnmwAL PnocDrE, § 244 (1963).
12 0 Neal itself would be an example of this last type of case because there the
arson and attempted murder violations occurred simultaneously.
3.2 CLArx & MnS m, Cnmu 1 (6th ed. 1958).
